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ENTITLED AS AGAINST NONE: HOW THE WRONGLY 
DECIDED CROKER ISLAND CASE PERPETUATES 
ABORIGINAL DISPOSSESSION  
Siiri Aileen Wilson† 
Abstract: Australia’s 1992 landmark case of Mabo v. The State of Queensland 
[No. 2] revoked the concept of terra nullius and for the first time since European 
colonization of the continent allowed indigenous Australians to obtain legal ownership of 
their traditional lands.  The following year this groundbreaking decision became statutory 
law with the enactment of the Native Title Act (NTA) of 1993.  The case law and the 
statutory act both failed, however, to adequately address the question of Aboriginal 
claims to sea properties.  For many Australian Aboriginal groups, ownership of 
traditional lands does not abruptly end at a shoreline but extends to surrounding coast 
lines, intertidal zones, and offshore seas.  This indigenous view is in stark contrast to 
Western concepts of property that have resulted in distinct bodies of law governing rights 
to the ownership of land versus rights to the ownership of sea. 
The NTA recognizes exclusive Aboriginal property rights whether the traditional 
area is a land or sea property.  The first case to test native title rights to sea property, The 
Commonwealth of Australia v. Yarmirr (“Croker Island”) held, however, that native title 
can be recognized without the right to exclude.  This precedential decision continues to 
bar exclusive Aboriginal ownership of sea properties and denies Aboriginal management 
of natural resources of the sea regardless of whether the group provides historical 
evidence of ownership and management.  This Comment argues that the Croker Island 
decision does not comply with the NTA, is based in an erroneous understanding of 
Aboriginal law and custom, and should be overturned.  This Comment further argues that 
where an Aboriginal group successfully provides evidentiary proof of a traditionally 
practiced right to exclude, native title must recognize and protect an exclusionary right to 
traditional sea properties.  Granting ownership of traditionally held properties is central to 
rectifying harms caused by Australia’s historic policy of dispossession of Aboriginal 
properties and is necessary to promote Aboriginal sovereignty. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The December 3, 2007 inauguration1 of Australian Prime Minister 
Kevin Rudd renewed hope that national reconciliation between Aboriginal 
Australians and white Australians could begin anew.2  Australia’s 
                                           
†
 Juris doctor expected in 2009, University of Washington School of Law.  The author would like to 
thank Professor Robert Anderson for generously giving his time and advice; Executive Comments Editor 
Karen Clevering for her endless encouragement, support, and hard work; and Christopher Parker, PhC., for 
sharing his expertise on Australian Aboriginal concepts of property.  The author would additionally like to 
thank Mr. Vivian Sinnamon and the Kokoberra, Kokominjena, and Kunjen people of Kowanyama, in 
particular, Ms. Priscilla Major, for their generosity and friendship.  
1
  Prime Minister of Australia, About Your PM, http://www.pm.gov.au/your_pm/index.cfm (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
2
  See Nick Squires, New PM Kevin Rudd to apologise to Aborigines, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH 
ONLINE, Nov. 27, 2007,  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1570584/New-PM-Kevin-Rudd-to-
apologise-to-Aborigines.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2008) (describing not only Rudd’s campaign promise to 
250 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 18 NO. 1 
 
Parliament first actively promoted reconciliation in 19913 after the Royal 
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody4 argued that Australia's 
history of Aboriginal land dispossession produced the current state of 
indigenous disadvantage.5  The Australian government’s historic practice of 
dispossession created a cycle of poverty, poor health, and limited 
educational opportunities that trapped Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Australians in an existence very different from other Australians.6  The 
report urged all political leaders and their parties to achieve reconciliation 
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities and to end community 
division and discord, as well as injustice towards Aboriginal people.7 
Prime Minister Rudd made reconciliation a central promise of his 
election campaign.8  For some, Mr. Rudd’s speech on February 13, 2008, at 
the Commencement of the 42nd Parliament fulfilled this promise.  On that 
historic day, Mr. Rudd delivered an official apology to all Indigenous 
Australians for the past injustices they suffered at the hands of the Australian 
government.9  Mr. Rudd promised to achieve reconciliation for all 
Australians and to create a future based in mutual respect, mutual resolve, 
and mutual responsibility.10  This goal, he said, would be achieved by 
                                                                                                                              
promote reconciliation, but also former Prime Minister John Howard’s standing refusal to apologize for the 
government’s historic policy of dispossession and the Stolen Generation).  
3
  The Australian government passed the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act in 1991.  
Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Law, http://www.comlaw.gov.au (Quick Search for 
“Aboriginal Reconciliation Act”) (last visited Sept. 18, 2008).  The Act created a ten-year Reconciliation 
Council to improve relationships between Aboriginal and European Australians.  Id.  The Act, and the 
Council, ceased in 2001.  See id.   
4
  See generally Australasian Legal Information Institute, The Final Report of The Royal 
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/IndigLRes/rciadic/index.html (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2008).  Between October 1987 and November 1990, the Royal Commission into Aboriginal 
Deaths in Custody investigated the deaths of ninety-nine Aboriginal persons in police and prison custody.  
Kathy Whimp, Final Report of the Royal Commission Into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody—Summary, 
Summary, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/IndigLRes/rciadic/rciadic_summary/rcsumk01.html (Nov. 30, 
2008).  The Commission required investigation and reporting on the underlying social, cultural, and legal 
issues behind the deaths as well as the immediate circumstances surrounding them.  Id. 
5
  Whimp, supra note 4, at Part C, Ch. 19. 
6
  The Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Finding Common Ground: Towards a Document for 
Reconciliation, 2. Reconciliation: A brief look at a long history, http://austlii.law.uts.edu.au/ 
au/orgs/car/docrec/relevant/docbook/p3.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).  The disparity between Aboriginal 
Australians and their European counterparts is readily seen in their distinct life expectancies, to name but 
one example.  See Jenna Gruenstein, Australia’s Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act: 
Addressing Indigenous and Non-Indigenous Inequities At The Expense of International Human Rights?, 17 
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 467, 467 (2008). 
7
  Id.  
8
  See Squires, supra note 2.  
9
  Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, Speech at the Commencement of the 42nd Australian House of 
Parliament, Apology to Australia’s Indigenous People (Feb. 13, 2008) (transcript available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/Rudd_Speech.pdf (last visited Sept 18, 2008)).  
10
  Id.  
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creating “a future where all Australians, whatever their origins, are truly 
equal partners, with equal opportunities and with an equal stake in shaping 
the next chapter in the history of this great country.”11 
Increasing Aboriginal ownership of traditionally held properties is 
critical to rectifying the harms caused by the Australian government’s policy 
of dispossession.  The historic case of Mabo v. The State of Queensland [No. 
2]12 was the first step in establishing a form of Aboriginal title to property 
that was legally recognized and protected by the Australian government.  
Since the High Court of Australia13 (“High Court”) handed down its ruling 
in that historic case, however, legal recognition for Aboriginal ownership of 
traditionally held properties has only become more elusive and more 
difficult to obtain.  Nowhere is this more evident than for Aboriginal 
communities seeking recognition of rights in traditional sea properties.  In 
the latest native title sea claim to reach the Federal Court, Gumana v. 
Northern Territory,14 ownership of offshore sea properties was easily and 
summarily denied15 based on precedent set by the High Court in the 2001 
case of The Commonwealth of Australia v. Yarmirr and Others (“Croker 
Island”).16 
Correcting the past injustices produced by Aboriginal dispossession of 
traditional properties requires revisiting the history of native title and its 
steady erosion from a mechanism for recognizing Aboriginal ownership to a 
mechanism for further dispossession.  Such a review reveals that in the 
Croker Island case, the High Court erroneously applied the framework for 
determination of Aboriginal ownership of property.  The same review 
further reveals that the Croker Island precedent erroneously interpreted the 
Aboriginal traditional law and custom that, as mandated by statute, defines 
native title rights. 
This Comment argues that the Croker Island decision should be 
overturned in order to rectify the continuing dispossession of Aboriginal 
property.  As it stands, this precedential decision negates the purpose of the 
                                           
11
  Id.  
12
  Mabo and Other Plaintiffs v. the State of Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1.  
13
  The High Court of Australia, which consists of a chief justice and six associate justices, is the 
country’s supreme court and the final court of appeal for both the federal and state court systems.  See High 
Court of Australia, Current Members of the High Court, http://www.hcourt.gov.au/justices_01.html (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2008) (listing the names of the Chief Justice and the six associate Justices).  
14
  Gumana v. Northern Territory (2007) 158 F.C.R 349. 
15
  Id. at 395 (explaining that the Gumana claim need not be analyzed as the High Court had already 
determined that Native Title is inconsistent with the public right of access to fishing and navigation).  
16
  The Commonwealth of Australia v. Yarmirr and Others (2001) 208 C.L.R. 1, 85 [hereinafter 
Yarmirr].  
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Native Title Act (“NTA”)17 and continues to prevent the legal ownership of 
traditional sea properties that the NTA sought to effectuate.  Part II analyzes 
the creation of native title as an exclusive property right to traditionally held 
land and sea properties.  Part III elucidates how the subsequent decision in 
The Wik Peoples v. The State of Queensland18 and the Native Title Act 
Amendments19 began eroding this exclusive property right by first creating a 
model of shared or coexistent rights and then limiting the types of land that 
Aboriginal people can claim.  Part IV explains how the High Court wrongly 
decided the Croker Island case and created the untenable precedent of an 
entirely non-exclusive right to sea property.  Part V argues that, had the High 
Court reviewed the factual record in Croker Island, the Court would have 
correctly found evidence of the Aboriginal exercise of the right to exclude 
that supports recognizing an exclusionary property right.  Finally, Part VI 
argues that the Croker Island decision must be overturned in order to 
effectuate the purpose of the NTA, rectify the historic practice of 
dispossession, and promote Aboriginal sovereignty. 
II. NATIVE TITLE CREATED AN EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY RIGHT FOR 
TRADITIONALLY HELD ABORIGINAL LAND AND SEA PROPERTIES 
For Aboriginal Australians, ownership of traditionally held land and 
sea properties only recently became a viable reality.  The historical roots of 
the indigenous struggle for land rights begin  in 1788 when Great Britain lay 
claim to Australia upon “discovery” of the continent.20  At the time of their 
arrival in Sydney Cove, British naval forces landed on a continent 
containing an estimated 750,000 native inhabitants.21  Despite this 
impressive native presence, the British declared the continent terra nullius, 
or unoccupied territory belonging to no one.22  This colonial ideology 
prevented Aboriginal ownership of land for the next two hundred years.23  
                                           
17
  The Native Title Act 1993, 1993 (Austl.) (Cth), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au (Quick 
Search for “Native Title Act 1993,” choose “Native Title Act 1993”) (“An Act about native title in relation 
to land or waters, and for related purposes”) [hereinafter The NTA].  The NTA codified the decision of the 
High Court of Australia in Mabo and created a framework for legal recognition of Aboriginal ownership of 
property. See PETER H. RUSSELL, RECOGNIZING ABORIGINAL TITLE: THE MABO CASE AND INDIGENOUS 
RESISTANCE TO ENGLISH-SETTLER COLONIALISM 287-88 (University of Toronto Press 2005).  
18
  The Wik Peoples v. The State of Queensland and Others (1996) 187 C.L.R. 1.  
19
  The NTA was significantly amended in 1998 in response to the Wik decision.  See infra Part III.  
20
  DAVID ANDREW ET AL., ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIA AND THE TORRES STRAIT ISLANDS 24 (2001). 
21
  Id. 
22
  Id.  
23
  Kamal Puri, Copyright Protection for Aborigines, in MABO: A JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 146, 87 
(Maragaret Anne Stephenson & Suri Ratnapala eds., 1993).  
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Not until 1992 did the landmark case of Mabo revoke terra nullius and 
create native title law, or indigenous land ownership and property rights.24 
The revocation of terra nullius created an opening for Aboriginal 
Australians to establish exclusive property rights in traditionally held land 
and sea properties.  The federal NTA in 1993 quickly followed the ruling in 
Mabo.25  Together, Mabo and the NTA created a new body of law, 
Australian Native Title, and gave the indigenous people of Australia legal 
recourse in their fight to obtain sovereignty over traditionally held 
properties. 
A. The Mabo Case Overturned Terra Nullius and Created an Exclusive 
Property Right for Aboriginal People 
Native title is a proprietary right to traditionally held Aboriginal land 
and sea property that is legally recognizable when shown to predate the 1788 
acquisition of the Australian continent by Great Britain.26  Proprietary 
property rights generally include the right to use and enjoy one’s property, to 
alienate one’s property, and to exclude others from the property.27  Prior to 
the landmark decision in Mabo the indigenous people of Australia possessed 
no inherent or preexisting legal rights to land under Australian law.28  
Aboriginal possession and occupation of traditionally held land and sea 
properties did not, however, cease during the intervening years between 
1788 and 1992.  Instead, Aboriginal people lived and fought for recognition 
of their land and sea rights all the while possessing what Aboriginal activist 
Noel Pearson has called, “204 Years of Invisible Title.”29 
The Australian government perpetuated the concept of terra nullius—
that the Australian continent was uninhabited at the time of European 
contact—to deny Aboriginal people the right to ownership of their 
traditional lands.  Eddie Mabo, David Passi, and James Rice, three members 
of the Meriam people who traditionally occupied the Murray Islands of the 
Torres Strait, successfully challenged this legal fiction in 1982 by suing the 
State of Queensland and the Commonwealth of Australia.30  Acting on 
                                           
24
  Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 40-43. 
25
  The NTA, supra note 17. 
26
  See ANDREW ET AL., supra note 20, at 23-29. 
27
  See Janice Grey, Is Native Title a Proprietary Right?, 9 MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J. L. ¶ 1, ¶ 20 
(2002) (Issue 3), http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v9n3/gray93.html (last visited Nov. 14 2008). 
28
  Noel Pearson, 204 Years of Invisible Title: From the Most Vehement Denial of A People’s Rights 
to Land to a Most Cautious and Belated Recognition, in MABO: A JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 75, 75 (Maragaret 
Anne Stephenson & Suri Ratnapala eds., 1993). 
29
  Id. 
30
  Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 3. 
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behalf of all indigenous Meriam, Mabo claimed that the Crown’s 
sovereignty over the islands of the Strait was subject to and burdened by the 
land rights of the Meriam based upon local custom and traditional native 
title.31  In filing the case in the High Court, Mabo sought a declaration that 
the Meriam “are (a) owners by custom; (b) holders of traditional native title; 
and (c) holders of usufructuary rights with respect to their respective 
lands.”32  Mabo further sought a declaration to establish that the Meriam’s 
native title rights had not been impaired by subsequent acts of the State since 
the acquisition of sovereignty.33 
The State of Queensland responded to Mabo’s legal challenge and 
enacted the Queensland Coast Islands Declaratory Act of 1985 (“Declaratory 
Act”).34  Under the Declaratory Act, the State of Queensland annexed all 
islands of the Torres Strait at the moment of statehood in 1879, 
extinguishing all previously existing rights, interests, or claims to the land.35  
The State argued that Australian law followed the precept that with the 
acquisition of state sovereignty came the ownership of all lands within the 
boundaries of the state.36  As such, there was no room for the common law 
to recognize a preexisting indigenous law that conferred native title.37 
In 1989, the High Court overturned the Declaratory Act as a violation 
of the federal Racial Discrimination Act (“RDA”), rejecting Queensland’s 
supposition and upholding Mabo’s claim to native title over the Murray 
Islands of the Torres Strait.38  Enacted in 1975, the RDA, cited as Australia’s 
first national human rights legislation,39 declares it: 
Unlawful for a person to do any act involving a distinction, 
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, 
descent or national origin which has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, 
on an equal footing, of any human right or fundamental 
                                           
31
  Id. at 4.  
32
  Id.  
33
  See id. at 5. 
34
  HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Landmark Cases Under the Racial 
Discrimination Act, in VOICES OF AUSTRALIA: EDUCATION MODULE 39, 40 (2007) available at 
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/education/voices/pdf/a5_landmark_cases.pdf (disscussing the role of the 1985 
Queensland Coast Island Declaratory Act in Mabo) [hereinafter HREOC RDA Cases]. 
35
  Id. 
36
  See Grey, supra note 27, at ¶ 4.  
37
  Id.  
38
  HREOC RDA Cases, supra note 34, at 40. 
39
  RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 52.  
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freedom in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other 
field of public life.40  
The justices of the High Court found that “the right to be immune from 
arbitrary deprivation of property is a human right . . . and falls within section 
9 of the [Racial Discrimination] Act.”41 
Two findings in Mabo established that neither the federal 
Commonwealth nor the State had extinguished the Meriam people’s native 
title.  First, the High Court found the Declaratory Act unconstitutional.  In 
arguing their claim before the High Court of Australia, the State of 
Queensland stipulated that the plaintiffs’ native title claims existed unless 
the Declaratory Act extinguished their claims.42  The State’s own stipulation 
recognized that the Meriam people practiced a system of land ownership 
prior to European colonization that undermined Australia’s long-held legal 
doctrine of terra nullius.43  Relying on this logic, the High Court found that, 
under Australian common law, indigenous people have the right to legal 
recognition as the proprietary owners of their traditional lands.44  On June 3, 
1992, ten years after the Mabo case was first filed, the High Court of 
Australia held that “the Meriam people are entitled as against the whole 
world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the lands of the 
Murray Islands.”45 
Second, in deciding Mabo, the High Court revoked the doctrine of 
terra nullius, further establishing that neither the Commonwealth nor the 
State had extinguished the Meriam people’s native title.46  The High Court 
legally recognized exclusive rights to traditionally held Aboriginal land and 
sea property because Aboriginal property rights both predated and survived 
European colonization.47  This ruling created a cause of action for 
indigenous Australians to pursue legal claims to ownership of traditionally 
held properties.48  In creating this common law action, the High Court 
declared that only two exceptions would prevent native title recognition:  1) 
where to do so would “fracture a skeletal principle of [the] legal system,”49 
or 2) where recognition of title would be “so repugnant to natural justice, 
                                           
40
  The Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, § 9(1) (Cth.).  
41
  Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 216.  
42
  See RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 208.  
43
  See id. at 215.  
44
  Id. at 210-11.  
45
  Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 2.  
46
  See id. at 68-69.  
47
  See id. at 69.  
48
  Id. at 113 (discussing the judicial relief available to native title holders denied rightful ownership).   
49
  Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 43.  
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equity and good conscience.”50  Without proof of one of these two 
exceptions, native title survives. 
B. The Native Title Act Codified Exclusive Property Rights in Aboriginal 
Land and Sea Properties 
In 1993, the NTA codified and confirmed the exclusive property 
rights of Aboriginal people to their traditional land and sea properties only 
one year after the High Court’s landmark decision in Mabo.  According to 
the NTA’s Preamble, the legislation seeks “to rectify the consequences of 
past injustices . . .  [by] securing the adequate advancement and protection of 
Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders.”51  The NTA aims to 
accomplish this advancement by ensuring that “Aboriginal peoples and 
Torres Strait Islanders receive the full recognition and status within the 
Australian nation to which history, their prior rights and interests, and their 
rich and diverse culture, fully entitle them to aspire.”52 
The NTA establishes the framework for obtaining exclusive property 
rights to traditionally held land and sea properties.  It defines native title as 
“the communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal 
peoples or Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters,” including 
protection of the rights to hunt, gather, and fish.53  Section 223 of the NTA 
creates a tripartite system for establishing native title “rights and interests” 
capable of recognition under the Act.54  All Aboriginal groups claiming 
native title ownership to land or sea property must demonstrate that their 
rights and interests:  a) are possessed under relevant traditional laws and 
customs, b) have by law and custom a connection to the place in which the 
rights and interests are said to exist, and c) are capable of recognition under 
the common law of Australia.55  Sections 223(a) and (b) are understood to 
encompass the core requirements56 that must be factually proven, while 
                                           
50
  Id. at 61.  
51
  The NTA at Preamble.  
52
  Id.  
53
  Id. § 223.  
54
  Id. § 223(1)(a)-(c).  
55
  Id.  
56
  Justice Robert French, Western Australia v. Ward: Devils (and Angels) in the Detail, 7 AUSTL. 
INDIGENOUS L. REP. 1 (2002) (Issue 3), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AILR/ 
2002/38.html (original paper presented at the 2002 Native Title Conference in Geraldton, Western 
Australia).  
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section (c) provides that proven rights will be recognized unless antithetical 
to a fundamental tenet of the common law.57 
To obtain native title, Aboriginal claimants must first prove that they 
have continually maintained a traditional association with the land or sea 
property that they are claiming because the NTA does not automatically 
recognize Aboriginal property rights.58  In order to obtain legal recognition 
of the property rights conferred under the NTA, Aboriginal groups must 
negotiate a complex filing process initiated by applying to either the 
National Native Title Tribunal (“National Tribunal”) or an approved state or 
territory tribunal.59  The government body created by the NTA, the National 
Tribunal, is the first arbiter of all native title claims.60 
Aboriginal groups must further prove that no contravening property 
claims extinguish61 their title and must identify all other existing interests in 
the claimed property.62  Aboriginal groups bear this burden of proof because 
native title persists until extinguished by the clear and plain intent of the 
sovereign.63  When a land holder or the State contests a native title claim, the 
National Tribunal will first attempt to mediate between the two parties.64  
Native title claims not resolved in mediation are referred to Federal Court 
for trial.65 
III. INDUSTRY LOBBYING THREATENS, AND ULTIMATELY ERODES, NATIVE 
TITLE’S EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY RIGHT 
Since the enactment of the NTA, industry lobbyists and conservative 
politicians have continually attacked and successfully eroded native title’s 
exclusive property right.66  In The Wik Peoples v. Queensland67 (“Wik”), the 
                                           
57
  The National Native Title Tribunal, Yorta Yorta High Court Appeal, NAT’L NATIVE TITLE HOT 
SPOTS NO. 3, at 4 (Dec. 2002), available at http://www.nntt.gov.au/News-and-Communications/ 
Newsletters/Native-title-Hot-Spots-archive/Documents/Hot_Spots_Number_3.pdf.  
58
  See Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v. Victoria (2002) 194 A.L.R. 538, 423, 
462-63. 
59
  RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 308.  
60
  The NTA §107.  
61
  Extinguishment is the destruction or cancellation of a right, power, contract, or estate.  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 405 (Abridged 6th ed. 1991). 
62
  RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 308.  
63
  See Fejo v. Northern Territory (1998) 195 C.L.R. 96, 102.  
64
  RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 308.  
65
  The Federal Court of Australia, http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/litigants/native/litigants_nt_what.html 
(last visited Sept. 20, 2008) (explaining that native title claims that fail mediation are referred to the federal 
court of the state or territory in which the claim was first filed). 
66
  Tyson Yunkaporta, Land Rights Australia: Extinguishment of Native Title and Ongoing Attacks on 
Aboriginal Land Rights, http://aboriginalrights.suite101.com/article.cfm/land_rights_australia (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2008). 
67
  The Wik Peoples v. The State of Queensland and Others (1996) 187 C.L.R. 1. 
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High Court presented the pastoralist68 industry with a compromise:  
coexistent rights to property where both native title and Crown-granted 
leases overlap.69  Following Wik, the 1998 Amendments to the NTA further 
limited native title land claims.70  Native title that predates Australian 
sovereignty calls into question and threatens the validity of all titles and 
privileges granted by the British Crown in the two hundred years since 
initial colonization.71  In Western Australia, this realization resulted in talk 
of secession from the Commonwealth.72  The mining industry similarly 
prophesized doom for the national economy.73  Talk of secession and 
predictions of economic disaster ended in 1996 with the High Court’s ruling 
in Wik.74 
A. The Wik Decision Divided Aboriginal Property Rights into Two 
Distinct Sets of Rights: Exclusive Rights and Coexistent Rights 
The High Court’s decision in Wik75 erroneously modified native title’s 
exclusionary property right by creating a new model of shared or coexistent 
rights.  By the slim majority of four to three, the Court held that while 
pastoral leases did not grant exclusive ownership to the leaseholder, where 
conflict between a pastoral lease and native title exists, native title rights 
must yield to the rights of the pastoralist.76  The NTA explicitly extinguishes 
native title rights when another owner holds the claimed property in freehold 
title.77  The Wik case, however, presented a new question of native title that 
neither Mabo nor the NTA definitively answered:  whether a government-
                                           
68
  The pastoral industry includes shepherds, herdsmen, and other workers directly involved in animal 
husbandry.  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 908 (2nd College ed. 1991).  
69
  See Wik, 187 C.L.R. at 2; RUSSELL, supra note 39, at 319-20.  
70
  See infra Part III.B.  
71
  See Noel Pearson, Paper presented at the High Court Centenary Conference, (October 9-11, 2003) 
(Paper, titled Land Is Susceptible of Ownership, available through http://www.capeyorkpartnerships.com 
/team/noelpearson/papers/NPlandSUSCEPTIBLE2003.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2008)); KENT MCNEIL, 
EMERGING JUSTICE? ESSAYS ON INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN CANADA AND AUSTRALIA 415 (Houghton Boston 
Printers 2001).  
72
  SEAN BRENNAN ET AL., TREATY 18 (2005). 
73
  Id.  
74
  RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 306.  
75
  Wik, 175 C.L.R. 1 
76
  Maureen Tehan, A Hope Disillusioned, An Opportunity Lost? Reflections on Common Law Native 
Title and Ten Years of the Native Title Act, 27 MELB. U. L. 523, 553 (2003).  
77
  ANDREW ET AL., supra note 20, at 30.  Freehold title is a property right granted to individuals by 
the Crown and is, in terms of ownership rights, analogous to U.S. ownership rights associated with title 
held in fee simple absolute.  LISA STRELEIN, COMPROMISED JURISPRUDENCE: NATIVE TITLE CASES SINCE 
MABO 39 (2006).  
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issued pastoral lease was analogous to freehold title in its ability to 
extinguish contravening native title claims.78 
The prevailing legal view was that government-granted pastoral leases 
extinguished native title.79  In 1994, the Federal Court of Queensland 
confirmed this assumption in holding that conflicting pastoral leases 
extinguished the native title claim of the Wik People80 after the Wik People 
filed suit seeking native title recognition of their exclusive ownership to 
more than 1600 square miles of land in Northern Queensland.81  Justice 
Drummond, sitting for the Federal Court, held that pastoral leases conferred 
exclusive possession and ownership to the pastoralists and extinguished “all 
incidents of Aboriginal title or possessory title.”82 
When a pastoral lease does not confer an exclusive property right to 
the pastoralist, however, the lease does not extinguish native title.83  Instead, 
the two distinct sets of rights are capable of coexisting and sharing 
ownership rights to the property.84  In Wik, the High Court reversed the 
Federal Court’s ruling and held that ownership rights to pastoral leases could 
coexist with native title rights to the same land.85  The Court further held that 
shared property rights existed even where the government leases failed to 
predate Aboriginal title.86  In Wik, the State of Queensland had granted 
leases to individual pastoralists, but failed to specify a right of exclusive 
possession in the leaseholder.87  The High Court held that, for the sole 
reason that the pastoral leases did not grant an exclusive property right, the 
leases were not inconsistent with native title.88 
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  RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 316.  
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  See id. at 318. 
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  Wik, 187 C.L.R. at 66.  
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  Id. at 3.  
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  Id. at 66.  
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  Id. at 122. 
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  Daniel Gal, An Overview of the Wik Decision, 20 U. N.S.W. L. J. 488, 490 (1997) (Issue 2), 
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The High Court’s decision subordinated native title property rights to 
the interests of the pastoralist industry.89  The majority opinion emphasized 
the importance to Australians of maintaining and protecting the pastoral 
system.90  When the opinion was issued, roughly forty percent of the 
Australian continent was under pastoral lease,91 and the Court’s decision 
clearly reinforced the status quo.  The High Court’s creation of coexistent 
rights to pastoral leases failed, however, to emphasize the NTA’s mandate to 
uphold and protect the Wik people’s native title rights.92  Instead, Wik 
modifies Mabo and the NTA to create greater protection for Australia’s 
pastoralists.  Speaking for the majority, Justice Toohey explained that when 
the traditional laws and customs of the Aboriginal group claiming the right 
are inconsistent with the rights conferred on the pastoral lease grantee, “to 
the extent of any inconsistency the [pastoralists] prevail.”93 
B. The Native Title Act Amendments Further Restricted the Ability of 
Aboriginal People to Obtain Property Rights 
The 1998 Native Title Act Amendments (“NTA Amendments”)94 
deny Aboriginal people their full rights in asserting native title ownership of 
traditional land and sea properties.  In response to the High Court’s ruling in 
Wik, the Australian government began work on a series of amendments to 
the NTA.95  When first unveiled in April of 1997, Prime Minister John 
Howard’s proposed amendments consisted of a “Ten Point Plan” that 
provided greater security to pastoral and mining industry concerns regarding 
the expense and potentially adverse outcome of prolonged native title 
litigation.96  This “Ten Point Plan” eventually evolved into more than three 
hundred pages of amendments to the NTA.97 
The NTA Amendments substantially reduced native title rights and 
severely limited the ability of Aboriginal groups to secure ownership of 
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traditionally held land and sea properties.  Among the most damaging of the 
amendments were the limitations placed on the right to negotiate prior to the 
enactment of future legislation, changes in the definition of what constituted 
“future acts” under the right to negotiate, and increased threshold 
requirements for the registration of new native title claims.98  These 
limitations diminished both the area of land and sea claimable under native 
title and the spectrum of future uses allowed upon recognized land and sea 
properties.99 
The NTA Amendments attempted, but ultimately failed, to clarify 
when Crown acts extinguish native title and require the government to 
provide just compensation to Aboriginal claimants.  The NTA Amendments 
divide Crown acts into two new categories:  1) acts of previous exclusive 
possession and, 2) acts of previous non-exclusive possession.100  Acts of 
previous exclusive possession, including Crown grants of freehold estates or 
the construction of public works, completely extinguish native title and may 
require just compensation.101  Acts of non-exclusive possession, such as 
Crown grants of pastoral or agricultural leases, extinguish native title to the 
extent of any inconsistency and do not invoke a just compensation 
analysis.102  Since the enactment of the NTA Amendments, however, the 
initial distinction between full and partial extinguishment has evolved into 
an uncertain array of possibilities for native title that now includes 
extinguishment, partial extinguishment, impairment, mere regulation, and 
Crown acts with no legal effect upon native title rights.103 
The NTA Amendments codified Wik’s inconsistency test.  Whether a 
land claim extinguishes a contravening native title claim depends on the 
property rights granted to the holder of the land claim.104  If the land holder’s 
property rights are non-exclusive, then there is no inconsistency between the 
rights of the land holder and the rights and interests of the native title 
claimant.105  A land holder’s non-exclusive property rights coexist with 
Aboriginal native title rights and the rights of each property owner are 
qualified only by the other co-owner.  Neither set of property rights is 
diminished nor qualified as against third parties. 
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  See Sean Brennan, Native Title and the Acquisition of Property Under the Australian Constitution, 
28 MELB. U. L. REV. 28, 77 (2004).  
104
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Native title property rights are partially or wholly extinguished when a 
contesting land holder possesses an exclusive right in the same property.106  
The extent to which the conflicting grant extinguishes any part of the native 
title claim is determined by reference to the respective rights conferred—in 
the case of the land holder by the grant and in the case of the native title 
holder by the “traditions, customs and practices of the particular Aboriginal 
group” claiming the right.107  This requires defining both the property rights 
of the land holder and the property rights of the native title holder to 
determine the extent of the conflict and the necessary extent of 
extinguishment of native title rights.  Only under this extinguishment branch 
of the inconsistency test are the property rights of the native title holder 
diminished as against third parties. 
IV. THE WRONGLY DECIDED CROKER ISLAND CASE CREATED A NON-
EXCLUSIONARY PROPERTY RIGHT THAT PERPETUATES DISPOSSESSION 
The High Court’s 2001 decision in the Croker Island108 case 
effectively extinguishes native title rights to offshore sea properties by 
holding that such rights are entirely non-exclusionary.  In 1994, Mary 
Yarmirr and other traditional owners representing five Aboriginal clans of 
the Yolngu People filed suit seeking recognition of their native title rights to 
the offshore seas of the Croker Island region of the Northern Territory.109  
This historic case was the first time Aboriginal people successfully brought a 
native title claim to traditionally held sea properties into the Australian court 
system.110  Despite successfully proving native title rights and interests that 
included the traditional exercise of the right to exclude,111 the High Court 
recognized entirely non-exclusive native title rights to the sea property.112  
The High Court reached this erroneous decision because they failed to 
follow the Wik precedent and ignored the mandate of the NTA. 
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A. The High Court Failed to Follow Wik’s Inconsistency Test in Croker 
Island 
In 1994, Mary Yarmirr, together with five other Aboriginal claimants, 
lodged a native title claim seeking “ownership and exclusive possession, 
occupation, use and enjoyment”113 of the seas of the Croker Island region.114  
The region, located in Australia’s Northern Territory, encompasses a series 
of islands and coral reefs that are the traditional home of the Madilarri-
Ildugij, Mangalarra, Muran, Gadurra, Minaga, Ngayndjagar, and Mayorram 
peoples.115  These Aboriginal clans, as with all Aboriginal people of the 
northeastern portion of Arnhem Land, collectively refer to themselves as the 
Yolngu, a word meaning “human being.”116  For the Yolngu, the sea is an 
integral part of their traditional laws and customs.117  The sea is represented 
in stories of ancestors who come from the sea and move onto the land, along 
the way creating the islands, reefs, and sandbars.118  The Yolngu connection 
to the sea is further evident in their dependence upon fish and other marine 
resources as a source of food and nutrition, for ceremonies, and for barter 
and exchange.119 
The Federal Court initially denied the Yolngu’s native title claim to 
exclusive ownership of the Croker Island region based on a finding of 
insufficient evidence.  On appeal from the National Tribunal to the Federal 
Court, Justic Olney held that while native title to the sea properties did exist, 
the Yolngu had failed to provide sufficient evidence of the exclusivity of 
their ownership.120  Justice Olney’s finding was based on the fact that the 
Yolngu’s native title rights were affected by, and had yielded to, the right of 
innocent passage and the common law right of the public to fish and 
navigate.121  In his final ruling, Justice Olney applied the Wik inconsistency 
test and held that the rights of the Yolngu to the use their traditional lands 
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existed to the “extent of the inconsistency” such that they could not prevent 
others from fishing or carrying out commercial activities in the area.122  
Justice Olney’s findings, on appeal, were upheld by the full Federal Court.123 
On final appeal to the High Court, the Yolngu argued for a qualified 
exclusionary right to their traditional sea properties, but were again denied 
any degree of exclusivity based on the lower court’s finding that they had 
failed to assert their right to exclude non-Aboriginal people from the 
region.124  The High Court, however, chose not to define the native title 
rights possible under a qualified exclusionary right, thereby failing to apply 
Wik’s inconsistency test to its analysis of the Croker Island claim. In so 
doing, the Court did not follow established precedent and did not provide a 
convincing rationale for its departure.  The High Court did not define the 
exclusivity of the contravening maritime rights as either entirely exclusive or 
non-exclusive and refused to define the native title rights at issue as 
precedent required.  Instead, in deciding Croker Island, the High Court 
created a new form of entirely non-exclusive ownership of Aboriginal 
property. 
Entirely non-exclusive native title is a right in name only as it fails to 
confer significant property rights to Aboriginal people.  The High Court 
based its decision on a finding that existing maritime regulations were 
inconsistent with, but did not extinguish, an indigenous exercise of the right 
to exclude.125  This finding of inconsistency limited native title rights to 
personal, domestic, or non-commercial activities for subsistence or cultural 
purposes, and ensured access to areas of sea and the ability to protect places 
of cultural and spiritual import.126  The Court affirmed native title rights 
associated with subsistence, but failed to recognize any rights associated 
with the management, ownership, and control of Aboriginal property.  The 
new form of native title failed to include a right to trade in the resources of 
the sea, to manage these natural resources, or to prevent exploitation of those 
resources by others.127 
The High Court denied the Yolngu the right to exclude others from 
their traditional offshore sea properties based on two erroneous 
presumptions.  First, the Court held that an exclusive right in sea property 
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cannot be both legally recognized and qualified by maritime law.128  Current 
examples of coexistent rights as well as examples of non-Aboriginal rights 
in offshore sea properties, however, refute this faulty conclusion.  Secondly, 
the Court affirmed, without reexamining the evidence, that the Yolngu had 
failed to establish that they had historically exercised a right of exclusion in 
accordance with their traditional law and custom.129  Had the High Court 
reviewed the Federal Court’s findings of fact in a light favorable to 
Aboriginal people, they would easily have found proof of the traditional 
exercise of the right to exclude. 
The High Court, in bypassing Wik and relying instead on these two 
erroneous presumptions, neither adequately explained nor supported its 
holding.  The High Court deferred to the Federal Court’s findings of fact that 
the Yolngu did not exercise a right to exclude while both acknowledging 
that maritime law could be qualified and refusing to decide whether the 
recognized native title “fractured a skeletal principle of the legal system” as 
required under Mabo.130  Based on case law precedent and the NTA, the 
High Court had two available methods for deciding the Yolngu native title 
claim: 1) apply the Wik test and find that the rights coexist, or 2) where an 
inconsistency is found, apply the NTA’s framework to determine whether 
native title had been extinguished.  The High Court did neither, and its 
newly created, non-exclusionary native title dramatically departs from both 
of these two established methods. 
The rights conferred under maritime law are not inconsistent with the 
exclusive rights traditionally exercised by the Yolngu.  Native title and 
maritime law can coexist.  The Court’s analysis fails in refusing to consider 
the possibility of a qualified exclusionary right as put forth by the Yolngu in 
their appeal, and as supported by Justice Kirby in his dissent.131  National 
and international maritime laws protect public rights of access to the sea.  
These public rights can coexist with a qualified exclusive native title right 
because native title can be termed legally “exclusive” while being 
effectively modified by both national and international maritime law.132  The 
three maritime rights under contention, the public rights of fishing and 
navigation, and the international right of innocent passage, therefore, do not 
                                           
128
  Yarmirr, 208 C.L.R. at 68.  
129
  Id. at 66.  
130
  Id.  
131
  Id. at 127 (Kirby, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is possible for a right to be recognized as legally 
exclusive, while technically qualified and limited by other legal rights). 
132
  See id. at 128. 
266 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 18 NO. 1 
 
prohibit recognition of native title as a qualified, but legally exclusive, 
property right. 
Native title, under a model of qualified exclusive possession, 
empowers traditional owners to exclude some people from their sea property 
while accepting those people genuinely exercising their public or 
international maritime rights.133  National and international maritime laws 
have not proven to be a barrier for non-aboriginal owners and thus should 
not preempt Aboriginal ownership and native title to sea properties.  For 
instance, the public right of fishing may be regulated or abrogated by the 
legislature.134  Exclusive fisheries grant exclusive rights to fish in a given 
place qualified by the rights of navigation and innocent passage.135  Australia 
recognizes exclusive rights in oyster beds as well as in leases of offshore 
sea-beds136 that are qualified by the both the right of navigation and the right 
of innocent passage.137 
Conflicting property rights either coexist with native title or partially 
or wholly extinguish native title.  The High Court upheld the Federal Court 
Judge’s findings of fact that effectively extinguished the Yolngu’s native 
title rights.138  In so doing, the majority went out of their way to create a 
new, unsupportable precedent.  The majority explained that the public rights 
to navigate and fish and the right of innocent passage “are rights which 
cannot co-exist with rights to exclude from any part of the claimed area all 
others.”139  The Croker Island majority erred in reasoning that it was not 
necessary to examine the question of the right to exclude because such a 
right was not extinguished by, but was inconsistent with, maritime law. This 
ignores Wik’s precedent establishing that contravening property rights either 
coexist or partially or wholly extinguish native title.140 
The fact that exclusive native title rights can be qualified and coexist 
with maritime law obligated the High Court to reexamine the Federal 
Judge’s findings of fact regarding whether the Yolngu successfully 
established their right to exclude. The NTA requires defining the content of 
native title—the property rights conferred and protected—by the traditional 
laws and customs of the specific Aboriginal group seeking legal recognition 
of their title.  Similarly, the High Court has stated that the content of native 
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title rights depends on traditional law determined by the evidence 
presented.141  The High Court acknowledged that the Yolngu had 
successfully proven their native title rights and interests such that native title 
was recognized.142  Defining this title without reference to the traditional law 
and custom of the Yolngu does not, however, comply with the mandate of 
the NTA.  Because it is possible for a qualified exclusionary form of native 
title to coexist with maritime law, it was imperative that the High Court 
reevaluate whether the Yolngu in fact exercised an effective right to exclude. 
B. The High Court Failed to Uphold the NTA in Croker Island 
The High Court also failed to uphold the express purpose of the NTA 
in deciding Croker Island.  The plain language of the NTA states that the 
purpose of the NTA is to protect Aboriginal ownership of traditional 
property, including inland waters and sea properties.143  Instead of protecting 
Aboriginal property rights, however, the High Court not only denied 
recognition of the rights traditionally exercised by the Yolngu of Croker 
Island, but also labeled the effective extinguishment of those rights as mere 
regulatory inconsistency.144  The Court wholly ignored the extinguishment 
branch of the inconsistency test and removed the possibility of just 
compensation.145 
When Aboriginal claimants successfully prove the effective exercise 
of a right to exclude, courts should not consider recognition of native title 
absent this established right.  Instead, the court should test the native title 
rights for any inconsistency with contravening property rights.146  First, 
courts must define native title property rights by examining the traditional 
law and customs of the Aboriginal group seeking legal recognition of their 
property rights.147  Second, in analyzing proof of the rights conferred by 
traditional law and custom, courts must accommodate Aboriginal 
perceptions of property and of the right to exclude.148  The NTA mandates 
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this analysis.149  Furthermore, case law clarifies that native title is Aboriginal 
law and is neither created nor defined by the common law.150 
The High Court failed to effectuate the purpose of the NTA:  to 
protect recognized native title rights.  The NTA’s Preamble states that the 
Act seeks to rectify the consequences of past injustices by “securing the 
adequate advancement and protection of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples . . . .”151  Section 3(a) defines one of the main objectives of 
the NTA as “the recognition and protection of native title.”152  The High 
Court has furthermore stated that the proper interpretation of Section 
223(1)(c) of the NTA shows that “the Federal Parliament obviously set out 
to protect and uphold the rights and interests of Australia’s indigenous 
people.”153 
Parliament clearly intended that the NTA include and protect 
Aboriginal ownership of traditional sea properties.  The NTA expressly 
addresses and allows for the recognition of the native title rights and 
interests of indigenous Australians to traditionally held sea properties.154  
Part I of the NTA, the Preliminary Section, states that the NTA shall apply 
and “extend . . . to the coastal sea of Australia and . . . to any waters over 
which Australia asserts sovereign rights under the Seas and Submerged 
Lands Act 1973.”155  This explicit language extends the reach of native title 
to the twelve-mile mark that delineates the boundary of Australian 
sovereignty over its coastal seas.156 
The language of the NTA indicates Parliament’s intent to protect 
native title rights to sea properties.  In resolving a question of the 
determination of native title rights, courts should turn first to the plain 
language of the statute.157  This requires that courts, in interpreting the NTA, 
read the Act as a whole and give regard to the NTA’s purpose of protecting 
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indigenous native title rights to traditionally held land and sea properties.158  
This commonly held logic was not lost on the entire High Court.  Justice 
Kirby stated in his dissent in Croker Island that the language and apparent 
purposes of the NTA contradict the notion that the Act was “merely 
repeating, or blindly and unquestioningly reflecting, pre-existing English, 
Imperial, colonial or early Australian differentiations between land and sea 
for legal purposes.”159 
The indigenous people of Croker Island successfully established that 
they possessed native title “rights and interests” as required by the NTA for 
legal recognition of Aboriginal ownership of sea properties.160  Their claim 
asserted exclusive ownership, occupancy, possession, and use of 3300 
square kilometers161 of water, the subsoil beneath the waters, and all inherent 
natural resources.162  The Aboriginal claimants satisfied Section 223 of the 
NTA and thereby proved their right to exclusive ownership by 
demonstrating that their rights and interests:  1) were possessed under 
relevant traditional laws and customs; 2) were, by law and custom, 
connected to the place in which the rights and interests existed; and 3) were 
capable of recognition under the common law of Australia.163  For the 
Yolngu of Croker Island, these traditional laws and customs included 
protection of fishing, hunting, and gathering rights for both subsistence and 
trade purposes.  Traditional law and custom further required that visitors and 
people from other indigenous groups gain permission prior to entering their 
land and sea country.164 
Reducing recognized native title to entirely non-exclusionary 
ownership of sea properties fails to protect Aboriginal rights and negates the 
purpose of the NTA.  The petitioners’ complaint in Croker Island asked the 
court to find that the indigenous people of the island had a recognized 
entitlement to possession, occupation, use, and enjoyment of the sea and sea-
bed within the claimed area to the exclusion of all others.165  In their 
complaint, the Aboriginal people of Croker Island recited their traditional 
laws and customs.  These traditional laws and customs, particularly the right 
of consultation, defined the scope of their native title claim to include the 
right to exclude.  Nonetheless, the High Court created a new form of native 
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title, an entirely non-exclusionary right, which does not protect Aboriginal 
rights and interests.  As a result, this non-exclusionary right “means that 
Croker Island traditional owners will have little say regarding developments 
on their sea country.”166 
V. THE CROKER ISLAND DECISION IGNORED EVIDENCE OF THE ABORIGINAL 
LAW OF THE RIGHT TO CONSULTATION THAT IS ANALOGOUS TO THE 
RIGHT TO EXCLUDE 
The Federal Court failed to recognize that the Aboriginal people of 
Croker Island exercised exclusive possession over their land and sea 
property because the Court narrowly focused on the Yolngu’s inability to 
exclude European colonists.167  The Yolngu provided the Federal Court with 
extensive evidence of their traditional exercise of the right to exclude.168  
Had the High Court properly reviewed the findings of fact, it could have 
rectified this wrong by considering how Aboriginal traditional law and 
custom defines the right to exclude. 
A. The Evidence Reveals that the Aboriginal Law of the Right to 
Consultation is Analogous to the Right to Exlude 
For many Aboriginal groups, outsiders are expected to gain 
permission prior to entering another clan’s country.  The process of asking 
and gaining permission is known as the “right to consultation” and is 
synonymous with the clan’s right to exclude.169  This is true for the 
indigenous people of Croker Island who continue to assert their right to 
exclude, despite colonization, as the right to consultation in all decisions 
concerning the access to, and the use of, their country.170  Unlike Australian 
law, Aboriginal customary law on the right to exclude others from 
traditional homelands defines the right in terms of holding, asserting, and 
exercising responsibility for the welfare of country.171  Aboriginal land and 
sea “ownership” is caring for clan territory.172  Deriving from this right to 
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care for country is the right to consultation about entry onto country and the 
right to allocate the use of country to others.173 
Aboriginal clans enforce their right to exclude by requiring outsiders 
to gain permission prior to entering or using the resources of a territory 
belonging to another clan.174  A clan’s power to grant or deny entry to 
traditionally held land and sea property is, in actuality, greater than the mere 
right to exclude.175  This is because the power to grant or deny permission 
includes not only the enforcement of proprietary rights to the land but also 
entitles an Aboriginal clan to determine all uses of the land and its resources, 
to define the cultural and ceremonial significance of the land, and to 
determine how the property will be transmitted to descendents.176 
The Aboriginal right to consultation is a proprietary right to exclude 
analogous to the right held by property owners that possess fee simple or 
freehold title to their land.  In exercising their right to consultation, 
Aboriginal clans are enforcing their right to use and enjoy their property, to 
alienate their property as they see fit, and to exclude others from accessing 
and using their land and resources.  In property law, the exercise of these 
rights indicates the exercise of a proprietary right.177  In exercising the right 
to consultation, Aboriginal people claiming exclusive native title to their 
traditionally held land and sea properties are asserting their right of 
entitlement to exclude as against all others. 
The right to exclude, even when it exists as the Aboriginal right to 
consultation, requires the corollary ability to enforce that right.  Aboriginal 
enforcement of the right to control access to clan homelands involves the 
placement of signs of occupation and the tracking of intruders.178  While 
these methodologies become more difficult across vast tracts of land, they 
are nearly impossible to implement over sea country.179  Instead, control of 
access to sea country relies on visual monitoring and the assumption that as 
travelers come into the enforcer’s field of vision they will travel directly 
towards the enforcer to make their intentions known.180  A traveler who fails 
to acknowledge the local right to consultation as the right to exclude is 
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assumed to be acting with the malicious intent to commit trespass and will 
be punished in accordance with the traditional law of the Aboriginal clan.181 
Native title as an exclusive, proprietary right is automatically 
extinguished where exclusive possession or occupation is interrupted for any 
reason.182  Aboriginal claimants asserting a proprietary native title right are 
therefore required to prove that their exclusive possession or occupation of 
their property has been “asserted effectively.”183  This requirement of the 
exercise of exclusive possession holds true even when it is the Australian 
government that has forcibly removed Aboriginal people from their land.184  
As explained by Aboriginal activist Noel Pearson, “Aboriginal people have 
hitherto been trespassers on their own land by virtue of the fact that their 
rights under the laws of white settlers have been obscured for two 
centuries.”185 
Without recognized native title, Aboriginal communities do not have 
the autonomous power to enforce trespass actions under Australian law.  The 
assessment of native title claims to traditionally held land and sea properties 
is based, in part, on both the historic and the modern ability to enforce 
trespass actions.  Yet, any inability to prosecute and punish trespassers has 
led some Australian courts to accuse Aboriginal communities of failing to 
exercise their right to exclude.186  This circular logic creates a conundrum 
for Aboriginal claimants that is only resolved by viewing their traditional 
right to consultation as analogous to the right to exclude.  As Justice Kirby 
noted in his dissent in Croker Island, “continual assertion of rights to be 
consulted in decisions concerning access to, and use of, the claimants’ 
country may be the highest feasible level of assertion of control by a fishing-
based society against Europeans where the latter were possessed of superior 
arms and legal power.”187 
B.  Croker Island Demanded a New Requirement of Aboriginal Claimants 
that is Both Unjust and Unattainable 
The majority decision in the Croker Island case set new precedent by 
requiring that Aboriginal claimants not only have to prove the observance of 
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traditional laws and customs amongst themselves, but also have to prove the 
enforcement of such laws and customs against non-indigenous people.188  
The majority reached this decision because they refused to review the 
findings of fact made by the Federal Court judge.189  The High Court 
deferred to the federal judge and relied on the findings of fact to reach their 
conclusion that the Yolngu native title should be defined without the right to 
exclude.190  The Federal Court, however, had declared that the facts not only 
failed to establish the effective exercise of an exclusionary right, but 
intimated the Yolngu’s native title rights were effectively extinguished.191  
The High Court deftly avoided the Federal Court’s ruling, but refused to 
review the evidence of the Yolngu’s exercise of the right to exclude on the 
record.192  Confusingly, the majority appears to have rejected the Federal 
Judge’s view that the Yolngu claim required proof of effective exclusion 
against Europeans by saying, “Nor is it necessary to identify a claimed right 
or interest as one which carries with it, or is supported by, some enforceable 
means of excluding from its enjoyment those who are not its holders.”193  
Unfortunately, in affirming the Federal Judge’s ruling, the High Court 
established that very precedent.  
Only Justice Kirby, viewing the right to consultation as analogous to 
the right to exclude, appears to have at least considered that the High Court 
might be required to review the Federal Judge’s erroneous findings of fact 
regarding the Yolngu’s evidence of exclusivity: 
To posit an obligation of the poorly armed forebears of the 
claimants to assert against the balanda194 (and for that matter 
the Macassans) . . . a right of physical expulsion, in order to 
uphold their native title over their sea country, . . . is to define 
the problem in terms of a desired outcome that would always be 
unfavourable to the rights of persons such as the claimants.195 
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Kirby argued that the ultimate purpose of the Mabo decision and the 
subsequent enactment of the NTA was to reduce and remove the 
discrimination against Aboriginal Australians that the law had previously 
condoned and that the High Court had declared unjustifiable.  Ignoring 
evidence of the Yolngu’s exercise of the right to exclude, Kirby explained, 
potentially reintroduced a discriminatory legal rule.196 
Courts must first define and determine the rights exercised by 
Aboriginal claimants in accordance with their traditional law and custom 
when assessing native title claims to sea property.197  This fact-based 
analysis includes accommodating Aboriginal concepts of the right to exclude 
and realistically considering the limitations of the exercise of such a right 
given more than two hundred years of colonization.  In failing to correct the 
Federal Court’s findings of fact, the majority in Croker Island erroneously 
defined a new form of title not based on the requirements of the NTA.  
Similarly, while Justice Kirby suggested that the findings of fact should have 
been reviewed, he failed to recognize that such a review was the necessary 
starting point for every analysis of native title recognition. 
VI.  THE CROKER ISLAND DECISION SHOULD BE OVERTURNED 
Under native title law, Aboriginal claimants must successfully prove 
an effective assertion of the right to exclude to gain exclusive ownership of 
their traditionally held land or sea property.198  This legal standard, 
reaffirmed by the High Court in 2002,199 requires indigenous claimants to 
prove that their traditional laws and customs included the exercise of the 
right to exclude at the inception of Australian sovereignty.  As explained by 
Justice Brennan in Mabo, native title originates in, and is given its content 
by, the traditional laws and customs observed by the indigenous people of a 
territory.200  Native title rights are ascertained as a matter of fact by reference 
to their laws and customs.201  The common law is, therefore, not obligated to 
recognize an exclusive property right if the Aboriginal claimants failed to 
effectively exercise their right to exclude.202  Where the evidence does 
establish the effective exercise of the right to exclude, however, courts must 
include the right to exclude in the bundle of recognized property rights. 
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A.  Aboriginal Traditional Law and Custom Define the Native Title Rights 
That the NTA Must Recognize and Uphold 
The High Court recognized native title absent the ownership rights 
that the Yolngu traditionally exercised.  The Yolngu of Croker Island proved 
that their traditional laws and customs defined their property rights to their 
sea country as proprietary.203  Both the majority and Justice Kirby in his 
dissent held that the claimants had provided the court with sufficient 
evidence to establish that the Yolngu had maintained a “connection with the 
lands or waters,”204 such that their native title “rights and interests are 
recognized by the common law of Australia.”205  The NTA’s definition of 
native title stipulates, however, that native title is, “the rights and 
interests . . . possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged, and the 
traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal peoples.”206  The NTA thus 
requires that the recognized native title rights be defined by Yolngu 
traditional law and include proprietary ownership. 
The sui generis, or unique legal status, of native title requires that it be 
defined by the traditional laws and customs of the Aboriginal group claiming 
title because it cannot be defined by Australian common law.  Common law 
property rights do not create native title.207  Native title originates from and 
is defined by the pre-contact legal order of Aboriginal people.208  As 
explained by Justice Brennan in the Mabo decision, “Native title, though 
recognized by the common law, is not an institution of the common law and 
is not alienable by the common law.”209  Native title exists where it predates 
the acquisition of Australian sovereignty and has not been subsequently 
extinguished by the Crown.  The role of the common law is, therefore, to 
recognize historically practiced Aboriginal laws and customs “as an 
embodiment of inherent and judicially cognisable bonds between Indigenous 
peoples and their ancestral lands.”210 
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B. A Non-Exclusionary Form of Title Not Based on Traditional Laws and 
Customs is Not Native Title and Perpetuates Aboriginal Dispossession 
Seven years after filing her native title claim to the offshore seas of 
Croker Island, Mary Yarmirr walked out of the High Court of Australia with 
a recognized native title that granted her fewer rights than she had 
previously exercised.  While her traditional law recognized the right to 
exclude, the right to control use of and access to the natural resources of the 
sea, and the right to use those resources for both trade and commercial 
purposes, her newly recognized native title protected none of these 
historically exercised rights.211  Instead, Mary Yarmirr and all the indigenous 
inhabitants of Croker Island received a form of recognized native title that 
merely affirmed their undisputed right to hunt, fish, and gather for 
subsistence purposes.212 
Native title that is not defined by the traditional laws and customs of 
the Aboriginal group seeking recognition is not native title.  Mary Yarmirr 
asserted and proved an exclusive native title right.213  The creation of an 
entirely non-exclusive property right by the majority of the High Court in 
Croker Island,214 much like their creation of coexistent property rights in 
Wik,215 served countervailing political interests at the expense of Aboriginal 
rights.216  By claiming that national and international maritime law made the 
exercise of an exclusive Aboriginal property right in the sea impossible,217 
the High Court chose to protect the rights of the fishing and pearling 
industry instead of adhering to the statutory language of Section 223 of the 
NTA. 
The High Court’s decision also deftly avoided the complicated 
question of compensation, which would have arisen had it held that national 
and international maritime law extinguished native title.  The NTA’s 
compensation regime for extinguishment of native title is extraordinarily 
complex.218  Determination of compensation is governed by Section 13(2) of 
the NTA and only applies to extinguished native title.219  To date, the first 
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and only case to reach the Australian courts on the question of compensation 
for extinguishment of native title is the 2006 case of Jango v. Northern 
Territory.220  In Jango, a federal court denied the Aboriginal claimants 
compensation, finding that the evidence did not demonstrate a consistent and 
sustained pattern of observance of their traditional laws and customs.221  The 
court denied compensation to the Yankunytjatjara and Pitjantjatjara people 
of the Northern Territory because they failed to prove the existence of their 
native title.222 
The High Court recognized the existence of the Yolngu’s native title 
rights to their offshore sea properties, but stripped valuable property 
rights.223  Based on the recent holding in Jango, had the High Court 
extinguished the Yolngu’s native title claim, instead of declaring it non-
exclusive due to regulatory inconsistency, the claim could have undergone 
an extinguishment analysis.  Such an extinguishment analysis could have 
resulted in the Yolngu receiving compensation for the loss of their property 
rights.  Compensation, while not the ideal of obtaining exclusive ownership 
of traditional property, goes further towards ending Aboriginal dispossession 
than native title absent meaningful property rights.  Instead of fulfilling the 
NTA’s mandate to “rectify the consequences of past injustices,”224 the High 
Court’s decision in Croker Island perpetuates more than two hundred years 
of denying property rights to indigenous Australians. 
Croker Island set an unjust precedent for all native title claims to sea 
properties.225  Since its ruling in 2001, the High Court has not accepted 
another native title case involving an appeal of a sea property claim.  In the 
most recent case to be ruled on, the 2007 case of Gumana v. Northern 
Territory,226 the Federal Court effortlessly held that the recognized native 
title of the Aboriginal people of Blue Mud Bay did not confer an exclusive 
                                           
220
  Tina Jowett & Kevin Williams, Jango: Payment of Compensation for the Extinguishment of 
Native Title, NATIVE TITLE RESEARCH UNIT ISSUE PAPER, Vol. 3, No. 8 (May 2007), 
http://ntru.aiatsis.gov.au/publications/2007pdfs/reports%20and%20other%20pdfs/Jango%20%5Bfinal%5D
.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2008). 
221
  Jango, 152 F.C.R. at 151. 
222
  Id. 
223
  See supra Part III. 
224
  The NTA at the Preamble. 
225
  See Michael White & Ryan Goss, Australian Maritime Law Update: 2004, 36 J. MAR. L. & COM. 
253, 275 (2005). 
226
  Gumana, 158 F.C.R. 349. 
278 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 18 NO. 1 
 
property right.227  The Federal Court’s sole reason for its holding was the 
precedent established by the High Court in Croker Island.228 
Nonetheless, Aboriginal peoples are continuing to fight for 
recognition of their native title rights to their traditionally held sea 
properties.  As of December 31, 2007, the National Tribunal had eighty-four 
active native title claims that included sea properties.229  The Aboriginal 
struggle for sovereignty and recognized ownership of traditionally held sea 
properties will continue until the High Court overturns Croker Island, the 
Australian government upholds the promise of Mabo, and until the NTA 
recognizes, respects, and legally protects Aboriginal law and custom. 
C. Reversing Croker Island Would Promote Aboriginal Self-
Determination 
Land rights play a critical role in the fight for Aboriginal self-
determination.230  Viewed in light of this ongoing struggle for self-
determination, native title claims to traditionally held land and sea properties 
are both an assertion of property rights and an assertion of sovereignty.231  
Prior to Mabo, the concept of terra nullius was the linchpin that recognized 
Crown ownership of all land and sea property across the Australian 
continent and acted to “dispossess, degrade and devastate the Aboriginal 
people.”232  Native title, properly applied, can rectify Aboriginal 
dispossession of land.  Furthermore, native title can secure the advancement 
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders through recognition of Aboriginal 
law and sovereignty over traditionally held land and sea properties.233 
Native title recognizes not just Aboriginal rights and interests in 
traditionally held land and sea properties, but also recognizes the autonomy 
of Aboriginal legal traditions.234  Native title, under both the NTA and 
Mabo, is a property right defined by the traditional laws and customs of the 
                                           
227
  National Native Title Tribunal, Appeal in Blue Mud Bay (Gumana)—Full Court, NATIONAL 
NATIVE TITLE HOT SPOTS NO. 24, at 7 (May 2007), available at http://www.nntt.gov.au/News-and-
Communications/Newsletters/Native-title-Hot-Spots-archive/Documents/Hot_Spots_number_24.pdf. 
228
  Id. 
229
  Native Title Research Unit, Native Title Applications, http://ntru.aiatsis.gov.au/research/ 
resourceguide/national_overview/national04.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2008). 
230
  See generally Ronald P. Hill, Blackfellas and Whitefellas: Aboriginal Land Rights, The Mabo 
Decision, and the Meaning of Land, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 303 (1995). 
231
  See id. 
232
  Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 104. 
233
  See Bradford W. Morse, Land Rights and Customary Law: A Comparative Analysis, in LAND 
RIGHTS NOW: THE ABORIGINAL FIGHT FOR LAND IN AUSTRALIA 185 (International Work Group for 
Indigeneous Affairs 1985). 
234
  Webber, supra note 208, at 62. 
JANUARY 2009 ENTITLED AS AGAINST NONE 279 
  
Aboriginal group asserting legal recognition.235  Formal recognition of 
native title therefore promotes Aboriginal sovereignty by acknowledging 
distinct indigenous interests in land and sea properties and facilitating self-
determination.236  To fulfill the purpose of the NTA and rectify past 
injustices committed against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, 
native title must, therefore, promote Aboriginal sovereignty. 
Overturning the Croker Island decision would promote Aboriginal 
sovereignty and help end Aboriginal dispossession.  Since Wik, the High 
Court has continually eroded native title property rights in response to 
industry lobbying and the efforts of conservative politicians.237  This assault 
on native title perpetuates dispossession and fails to uphold the promise of 
Mabo and the mandate of the NTA.  In order to fulfill his election promise 
of ensuring reconciliation between Aboriginal and white Australians, Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd must do more than merely apologize for past 
injustices—he must end the current, ongoing dispossession of property from 
Aboriginal people.  The High Court continues to adhere to the erroneous 
analysis of Aboriginal law and custom established in Croker Island.238  
Parliament, guided by Prime Minister Rudd’s vision of an Australia where 
all citizens are equal,239 must reaffirm that when an Aboriginal group 
successfully provides evidentiary proof of a traditionally practiced right to 
exclude, native title will recognize and protect that exclusionary right to 
ownership of both traditional land and sea properties. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Aboriginal property rights extend not only to land, but to surrounding 
coastlines, intertidal zones, and offshore seas.  This title is not a title of mere 
occupancy but includes the right to exclusive use of the sea property, its 
inherent resources, and the right to exclude others.  Where an Aboriginal 
group can successfully prove that its traditional laws and customs include 
the effective exercise of the right to exclude, native title should confer 
proprietary rights to the claimed area whether the traditional area is a land or 
sea property.  Recognition of native title based on traditional law and custom 
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upholds the purpose of the NTA and is the clear mandate of the NTA based 
on the plain language of the statute. 
Court decisions, such as the Croker Island decision, that recognize a 
form of title that is entirely non-exclusionary do not recognize native title.  
Instead, such decisions effectively extinguish Aboriginal rights that predate 
European colonization.  This extinguishment threatens Aboriginal 
sovereignty, impedes reconciliation between Aboriginal and white 
Australians, and fails to rectify more than two hundred years of Aboriginal 
dispossession.  Overturning the Croker Island precedent would be a small 
but necessary step towards creating a new Australia where indigenous and 
European cultures are equally valued. 
